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Abstract: We employ an experimental labour setting to study fairness in the division of 
gains from productive activity. The focus is on the impact of power structures on 
allocation decisions and on fairness perceptions. Two types of actors are involved in 
generating a gain, but only one of them contributes actively by completing a real-
effort task. In three treatments, decision power to divide the gain is assigned (1) to the 
inactive, (2) jointly to the inactive and the active, and (3) to the active. Results show 
that the impact of power goes beyond changing final allocations: it also significantly 
alters fairness perceptions. Decision power - in particular absolute power – mediates 
and significantly enhances self-serving biases. Results complement studies on the 
psychology of fairness perceptions. Moreover, the paper discusses implications for 
organizational design. 
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1 Introduction 
How should economic gain be divided between the different actors that are involved in its 
generation? The division of economic gain from productive activity has been among the central 
and most controversial issues in economic history. Whereas modern economic theory focuses 
more on efficiency wages and on remuneration for risk-taking, controversy in the public debate 
often involves a demand for justice or fairness. Contemporary topics include minimum wage 
regulations, the limits to executive pay, or recent developments in returns to labor and capital. In 
an international context, “Fair Trade” aims to divide profit in a way that pays higher wages to 
workers in third-world countries. Overall, fairness in the division of economic gain seems 
desirable. But then, when is a division of economic gain fair? 
Consider a situation in which two people freely agree to participate in a productive 
activity, but only one of them contributes actively by completing a non-trivial task while the 
other remains inactive. If the “Active” completes the task successfully, both receive a sure 
minimum compensation for their involvement, but an additional gain has to be divided. What is 
the fair share for the Active? Even in this simple setting, different kinds of reasoning may lead 
to different conclusions about what is fair (cf., Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985, Konow, 2003, 
Cappelen, Hole, Sorensen and Tungodden, 2007). As we will argue below, all possible divisions 
could in fact be justified as fair according to different theoretical fairness ideals. Since fairness 
perceptions tend to be biased toward self-interest (cf., Messik and Sentis, 1979, Babcock and 
Loewenstein, 1997), we also expect fairness judgments to differ between Actives and Inactives: 
Actives will consider as fair a higher wage for themselves than Inactives. But now, does the 
perception of fairness depend on who has the power to allocate the economic gain? For instance, 
would Inactives judge the same divisions as fair, regardless of whether they have the power to 
decide or not? 
This paper employed such an experimental laboratory setting to investigate the impact of 
decision power on fairness in the division of economic gain. In three experimental conditions 
we assigned (1) absolute power to Inactives, (2) shared power to both Inactives and Actives, or 
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(3) absolute power to Actives. Our results revealed that power affected actual divisions: Actives 
ended up with higher wages when they had more power to decide about them. Much more 
surprisingly, power also changed fairness perceptions. In general, the more power a party was 
given, the higher was the share which was judged as fair for that party to receive. For instance, 
Inactives with decision power acknowledged a lower wage for the Actives as fair than when 
they had no power. In particular, absolute power - in contrast with shared power - significantly 
changed fairness judgments of the powerful party. In this manner, power seemed to mediate a 
large portion of a bias that is typically attributed to self-interest. Our results show that it is not 
only self-interest per se which biases the perception of fairness; it is especially the power to act 
in line with this self-interest.  
On the one hand, our findings contribute to understanding the psychology behind fairness 
perceptions and the way people trade off fairness considerations with monetary self-interest. On 
the other hand, it may provide insights for policy makers. After all, decision power, e.g. about 
the division of gains within corporations, is a variable that is subject to organizational design. 
When fairness in the division of economic gain is desirable, it may be important to take into 
account that fairness perceptions are sensitive to power structures beyond the direct impact on 
divisions. 
The following section 2 introduces the literature on fairness in the division of gains from 
productive activity. Section 3 describes in detail the experimental design, and section 4 presents 
the results from the three experimental treatments. Section 5 provides a discussion of 
implications for the psychology of fairness perceptions and for organizational design. Section 6 
concludes. 
2 The quest for fair divisions 
Fairness in distributions has been dealt with across many disciplines. Konow (2003) 
provides an exhaustive overview of both the theoretical and the empirical contributions. In this 
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section, we point out the findings which appear most relevant for the context of fairness in the 
division of gain from productive activity. 
Philosophical theories of fairness may offer guidance on what is a fair division of 
economic gain. However, a closer look at the multiplicity of – sometimes conflicting - theories 
reveals that philosophical analysis cannot provide a definite answer. For instance, theories of 
distributive justice consider the total economic gain and then propose a fair division. But then, a 
strict version of an egalitarian theory divides equally between the involved parties, while a 
meritocratic (i.e., desert-based) theory splits proportionally to the contributions. In our example, 
egalitarian theory would propose an equal split of the gain, and meritocratic considerations 
would suggest giving more – or even the entire additional gain - to the Active. Nozick (1974) 
takes a different approach, when he argues for the principle of “justice in transfer”, according to 
which all allocations resulting from freely chosen transfers are fair. Applying such a libertarian 
conception of fairness, transfers of wage for labor could be regarded as fair whenever certain 
conditions are met, most importantly the respect for all actors’ freedom of choice. In our setting, 
both parties freely agree to participate for the sure minimum compensation and they accept the 
prevailing power structure. For example, when the Inactive has absolute power, libertarian 
reasoning could justify keeping the entire additional gain. After all, in this case the Active knew 
that the minimum compensation was all he was entitled to receive for sure. Clearly, such 
libertarian criteria are not sufficient for guaranteeing fairness according to distributive justice. It 
is noteworthy that in our simple example virtually any division is justifiable as fair by an 
appropriate standard, e.g. applying libertarian, egalitarian or meritocratic reasoning. This is 
likely to hold true also for many – typically more complicated - natural settings. 
Alternatively, the question of fairness may be regarded as an empirical one. Lay intuitions 
about fair divisions have been studied across disciplines. While some studies set out to test 
specific theories (see e.g. Froehlich and Oppenheimer, 1992, for a test of the Rawlsian 
“difference principle”), others investigate more generally the extent to which folk conceptions 
reflect a consensus on certain principles. In an interview study, Alves and Rossi (1978) identify 
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considerations of need and merit as main determinants of fair earnings. In the economic 
literature, many empirical studies emphasize the importance of fairness considerations for 
judgments and for actual behavior (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986; Hoffman, 
McCabe and Smith, 1996, Camerer, 2003). Empirical economic studies on fairness in allocation 
decisions typically rely on controlled and simplified settings in laboratory environments. With 
regard to principles behind fairness, Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) summarize their results stating 
that people usually apply meritocratic reasoning, and that they use egalitarian norms when there 
is “no obvious morally relevant distinction” between the parties. The importance of merit for 
fairness is also emphasized in Konow (2000), who suggests a model in which people maximize 
their utility by trading off their personal gains and costly deviations from what they judge as the 
fair division. Cappelen et al (2007) use a similar parametric utility model to examine this trade-
off. They show explicitly that people differ in the extent to which they combine a freely chosen 
investment level (i.e., an effort choice) and an exogenously given rate of return (e.g., due to 
talent) as determinants of what are fair shares of gains from joined production. Overall, the 
pluralism of fairness ideals in lay intuitions is a recurring theme for situations involving gain 
from productive activity – even in simplified laboratory settings. Moreover, as mentioned at the 
outset, under circumstances of “moral ambiguity”, Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) summarize 
an impressive body of empirical evidence showing that people tend to rely on the fairness 
notion which favors what is in their self-interest. For situations that are characterized by conflict 
of interests, this psychological phenomenon may further inhibit consensus on what may be 
considered fair. 
The results from the present work relate to the mentioned findings. In particular, fairness 
judgments in our experimental setting allowed conjectures for discriminating between fairness 
principles which people intuitively rely on. Also, our findings illustrated that participants traded 
off fairness considerations with monetary self-interest; they even admitted to have done so. As 
said, however, the novel and central aspect in this study was the impact of decision power. 
Clearly, power affects allocations, since parties with unconstrained power may even decide to 
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take as much as possible from jointly produced gains. In addition, however, our findings 
showed that the allocation of power can change fairness perceptions. While such an effect may 
have interesting implications, it has so far not found explicit mentioning in the literature. 
3 Experimental design  
In the experiment, two actors were involved in the generation of economic gain: an 
“Active” and an “Inactive” (they were labeled A1 and A2 – for the complete instructions see 
Appendix). Participants were randomly assigned their role and matched to build pairs of Active-
Inactive. Only Actives completed a tedious real-effort task which consisted of counting letters in 
different parts of a text. Inactives had nothing special to do, but could relax, read (we provided 
newspapers), do homework, etc. Participants never found out who was their partner, but they 
could see that in the room there was a group of Actives who were busy counting and a group of 
Inactives who were typically reading the newspaper. Also, Inactives were shown the text with 
the counting exercise so that they could infer the difficulty of the task. Only in case of 
successful task completion within 20 minutes, an experimental gain of € 16 was generated. Of 
the € 16, both Active and Inactive received the same fixed amount of € 3 as a minimum 
compensation. The excess gain of € 10 had to be divided between the two actors. The change in 
design across the three treatments consisted in the assignment of decision power about how to 
divide the excess gain: 
 
Treatment 1 - “Inactives decide” how to divide the € 10.  
Treatment 2 - “Both decide” and have to agree how to divide the € 10. 
Treatment 3 - “Actives decide” how to divide the € 10. 
 
Upon knowing the exact procedure - including the assignment of decision rights - and 
knowing their personal role, each participant marked on a sheet of paper whether he or she 
agreed to stay in the experiment or preferred to leave with a show-up fee of € 2. Participants 
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who preferred to leave were substituted. This feature of the design made explicit the 
participant’s free agreement to the experimental conditions. 
In Treatment 2 – “Both decide”, Active and Inactive determined the allocations jointly in a 
repeated simultaneous-offers bargaining procedure. If they agreed (i.e., their proposals 
coincided), then the division was implemented. If they disagreed, they were informed about the 
proposal of the other party and they were asked to make a new proposal. This procedure was 
repeated until they reached an agreement. We chose this bargaining procedure because it was 
easy to understand and gave participants equal power (e.g., no first-mover advantage, no 
informational asymmetry, etc.). Those pairs of participants who agreed quickly left the 
experiment earlier, but we assured that they could not infer who had been their counterpart. 
Experimental measures. In all three treatments we observed the divisions of the € 10 excess 
gain. Throughout the paper, results will be reported in terms of the payments that were given to 
the Active. After the actual division was made, we asked participants the following question: 
“What do you think would be the fair division?” These fairness judgments will be reported in 
terms of “fair payment to the Active”.1 In a subsequent questionnaire, participants were asked to 
state arguments for giving money to the Active and for giving money to the Inactive. 
Arguments served as complementary data to get an insight into the reasoning behind allocation 
decisions and fairness judgments. Previous experimental work in economics usually infers 
fairness ideals from behavior, while psychological studies tend to rely on questionnaires. In the 
present study we combine both methods. One advantage of this method is that it allows to 
identify discrepancies between an individual’s fairness ideal and his or her factual behavior. 
Experimental frame. Treatment 1 – “Inactives decide” and Treatment 3 – “Actives decide” 
represent variants of the Dictator Game. The Dictator Game is widely  recognized as an 
                                                 
 
1 The question varied slightly depending on the role and the treatment. It was phrased “Independently [of your 
decision how much to give / of what you think you will receive/ of the final division], what would be the fair 
division?”. Note that in Treatments 1 and 3 the party with absolute decision power answered the question after having 
made the decision, while the other party was asked before receiving information about the actual payment. It would 
be interesting to see whether dividers would judge fairness differently when asked prior to the payment decision and 
whether this would change behavior. 
 8
“interesting vehicle for studying the meaning and interpretation of fairness” (Hoffman et al., 
1996). However, it has been criticized for not representing a genuine social situation, in 
particular that money comes as “manna from heaven” (see e.g., Bardsley, 2005). Here, the game 
was embedded into a particular experimental frame in which economic gain was generated by 
productive activity. Productive activity in economic experimentation has been operationalized 
differently. For instance, whereas participants in Konow (2000) prepare letters for mailing, 
Capellen et al (2007) mimic production by a monetary investment decision. In the present study, 
Actives had 20 minutes to count correctly the frequencies of the letter M in different parts of a 
text. 
Note that risk in this experimental setting was symmetric and that efficiency considerations 
did not play a role. Of course, these aspects play important roles for the division of gains from 
production in natural environments. However, the purpose of the present design was to provide 
a simplified benchmark of a genuine labor context, hence the focus on active vs. inactive 
involvement. 
Recruiting and computerization. The experiment was computerized with z-tree software 
(Fischbacher, 1999) and conducted in the experimental laboratory (LEEX) at Pompeu Fabra 
University. Participants were 168 students from various fields of study who were recruited using 
the ORSEE online recruitment system (Greiner, 2004). They participated in nine sessions (16 to 
20 participants per session) between October 2006 and May 2007. 
4 Results 
Two of 168 participants decided to leave the experiment after learning the rules and their 
personal role; one Inactive in Treatment 2 and one Inactive in Treatment 3. They were 
substituted. 
80 of 83 Actives managed to generate the gain by completing the task in 20 minutes. 
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Treatment 1 – “Inactives decide” (N = 2 x 25) 
Payments. Frequencies of payments to the Active are depicted in Figure 1. The distribution 
of payments ranged from € 0 to € 5, with two modes at € 0 and at the equal split of € 5 (6 out of 
25, respectively). The mean was € 2.6.  
Fairness judgments. Fairness judgments for Inactives and Actives are also shown in Figure 
1. The majority of Inactives (17 of 25) stated that the equal split is fair. The mean judgment of 
Inactives was € 5.3. 18 of 25 Inactives (72%) admitted that their payment to the Active was less 
than what would have been fair. Actives’ judgments were more evenly distributed between € 5 
and € 10, their mean judgment was € 7.2. The difference in the distributions is statistically 
significant (Mann Whitney rank test - MWR: p < .01). 
Figure 1 -- Relative frequencies of payments to the Active and of fairness judgments in 
Treatment 1 - "Inactives decide" 
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Treatment 2 – “Both decide” (N = 2 x 27) 
Payments. The distribution of payments to the Active ranged from € 5 to € 7 (see Figure 
2). The modal payment was € 6 (14 of 27) and the mean payment was € 5.7. 
Fairness judgments. Fairness judgments by Inactives and Actives are also shown in Figure 
2. The modal fairness judgment of both Inactives and Actives was € 7. While many Inactives 
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judged € 5, € 6, or € 7 as fair, many Actives stated € 7, € 8, or € 10 as the fair payment. Means 
were at € 6.3 for Inactives and at € 7.5 for Actives; this difference is statistically significant 
(MWR: p < .01). 
Figure 2 -- Relative frequencies of payments to the Active and of fairness judgments in 
Treatment 2 - "Both decide" 
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Bargaining procedure. The number of bargaining periods until an agreement was reached 
ranged from 2 periods (lasting approximately 1 minute) to 66 (approximately 20 minutes) with a 
median of 5 (approximately three minutes). Mean proposals of Inactives in the first bargaining 
period were 3.5, those of Actives were 7.9. Hence, the average difference between first 
proposals and final divisions (5.7) were similar for Inactives and Actives (2.15 vs. 2.26; 
difference not significant). It is interesting to note that on average both roles’ first proposals are 
more self-interested compared to what they consider fair, but that this is considerably more so 
for Inactives (compared to their fairness judgment, Inactives proposed on average 2.8 less to the 
Active; Actives proposed only .4 more). Apparently the (symmetric) power structure is already 
reflected in first proposals, pulling allocations away from more meritocratic to more egalitarian 
outcomes. 
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Treatment 3 – “Actives decide” (N = 2 x 28) 
Payments. The distribution of payments to the Active ranged from € 5 to € 10 (see Figure 
3). The modal payment was € 10 (19 out of 28) and the mean payment was € 9.1.  
Fairness judgments. Fairness judgments for Inactives and Actives are also shown in Figure 
3. The modal judgment of Inactives was the equal split; their mean judgment € 6.7. The modal 
judgment of Actives was € 10; their mean judgment € 8.5. 42% of Actives admitted that they 
gave less than what would have been fair. The difference in the distributions is statistically 
significant (p < .01, MWR).2 
Figure 3 -- Relative frequencies of payments to the Active and of fairness judgments in 
Treatment 3 - "Actives decide" 
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Payments and fairness judgments across treatments 
Table 2 summarizes mean payments and mean judgments in all three treatments. Inactives 
in Treatment 1 paid on average 2.6 to the Actives; Actives in Treatment 3 paid on average 9.1 to 
themselves. Mean payments to Actives from the agreed upon divisions in Treatment 2 were 5.7, 
which is close to the mean between the other two treatments. 
                                                 
 
2 We lost fairness judgments from three participants in one session of Treatment 3 due to computer problems. 
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Average fairness judgments ranged from 5.3 (Inactives in Treatment 1) to 8.5 (Actives in 
Treatment 3). Apart from individual differences, average fairness judgments revealed 
considerable variation depending on the role, i.e., whether participants were Inactives or 
Actives, but also for the same role depending on the experimental treatment. Table 2 reports 
results of the Mann-Whitney rank test on the differences between the respective distributions (p-
values in parentheses between the means).  
Table 2 -- Mean payments to the Active (row 1) and mean judgments (rows 2 and 3) in 
all treatments 
 Treatment 1 – “Inactives decide”
(25 pairs) 
 Treatment 2 – 
“Both decide”
(28 pairs) 
 Treatment 3 -  
“Actives decide” 
(27 pairs) 
Actual payments 
to the Active 
 
2.6 
 
(p<.01) 
 
5.7 
 
(p<.01) 
 
9.1 
 
Inactives judge as 
fair payments 
 
 
5.3 
 
 
(p<.01) 
 
 
6.3 
 
 
(n.s.) 
 
 
6.7 
 (p<.01)  (p<.01)  (p < .01) 
Actives judge as 
fair payments 
 
7.2 
 
(n.s.) 
 
7.5 
 
(p< .01) 
 
8.5 
 
• P-values in parentheses indicate whether the respective distributions of payments or of  fairness judgment 
are statistically different according to the Mann-Whitney rank test (n.s. = not significant).  
• P-values for tests between Treatments 1 and 3 are not reported; distributions are clearly distinct. 
 
Distributions of fairness judgments between Inactives and Actives were significantly 
different in all three treatments (p < .01, MWR). Across treatments, the second row of table 2 
reveals that Inactives’ judgments of what was the fair share to Actives were lower the more 
decision power Inactives were assigned: 5.3 for absolute power, 6.3 for shared power, 6.7 for no 
power (correlation coefficient ρ = -.28, N = 79). Differences were statistically significant 
between full power and shared power (p < .01), but not between shared power and no power (p 
= 514). In particular, the share of Inactives that opted for the equal split as the fair outcome 
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decreased from 68% in the case of absolute power to 37% (shared power) and 30% (no power). 
For Actives, more decision power meant higher judgments of what was their fair share: 8.5 for 
absolute power, 7.5 for shared power, and 7.2 for no power (ρ = .32, N = 78). Again, differences 
were statistically significant between absolute power and shared power (p = .03), but not 
between shared power and no power (p = .459). 
In order to compare across treatments (T = 1,2,3) the homogeneity in fairness perceptions 
between the two parties, we calculated for the KT interacting pairs the difference between what 
the Active judged as fair and what the Inactive judged as fair.3 On average, this difference was 
2.80 in Treatment 1 (K1 = 25), 2.00 in Treatment 2 (K2 = 25), and 2.84 in Treatment 3 (K3 = 
27). According to the Mann-Whitney rank test, differences in Treatment 2 were significantly 
smaller than in both other treatments (T2 vs. T1: p =.07, one-tailed; T2 vs. T3: p = .06, one-
tailed), whereas they were almost the same in Treatments 1 and 3. Hence, fairness judgments of 
Actives and Inactives were more homogeneous under shared power compared to the two 
conditions in which one party was assigned absolute power. 
Last, it may be illuminating to attempt a quantification of the relation between fairness 
judgments and actual divisions across experimental treatments. For that purpose we calculated 
for all NT participants within treatments T = 1,2,3 the (absolute) differences between what the 
participant actually got paid and what he or she judged as fair to receive. On average, the 
difference between judgment and payment was 3.64 in Treatment 1 (N1 = 50), 1.44 in Treatment 
2  (N2 = 54), and 2.13 in Treatment 3 (N3 = 53). According to the Mann-Whitney rank test, 
differences in Treatment 2 were significantly smaller compared to both Treatment 1 (p < .01, 
one-tailed) and to Treatment 3 (p = .07, one-tailed), and they were significantly smaller in 
Treatment 3 compared to Treatment 1 (p < .01, two-tailed). Hence, of the three treatments, 
outcomes differed most from what was perceived as fair when only inactive participants decided 
about the division of the additional gain. Divisions were closer to fairness perceptions when 
                                                 
 
3 Differences are reported in absolute terms, typically the higher judgment was from the Active. 
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absolute decision power was in the hands of those who were active, and they were closest when 
decision power was shared by both parties that were involved. 
Arguments to justify allocations 
In the questionnaire following the allocation decision we asked participants to “please give 
[up to three] arguments in favor of allocating money to A1” (the Inactive) and to “please give 
[up to three] arguments in favor of allocating money to A2” (the Active). Reasons for allocation 
decisions served to gain an insight into the extent to which reasoning reflected different fairness 
notions.  
We compared arguments and classified them into categories. The most frequent argument 
was based on “amount of work / effort / time spent” and thus reflected considerations of merit. 
Two types of arguments were supportive of an egalitarian division: “roles were determined by 
chance” and “both players are needed and are part of the team”. These arguments were typically 
given to justify the allocation of money to the Inactive. 
Table 3 reports the frequencies with which participants wrote down arguments from a particular 
category. For example, the two far left columns show the arguments which were given for 
allocating money to Actives in Treatment 1; the very left column presents the number of times 
that Actives gave the arguments, the second left column presents the number of times that  
Inactives did so.  
The majority of participants stated the amount of work or effort as a reason for giving money to 
Actives. In addition, this argument was used by some to justify allocating money to Inactives. In 
these cases, participants usually stated that “A1 had to spend time in the experiment”. In all 
three treatments, Inactives and Actives recognized this argument almost equally often as 
justification for giving to Actives (24 vs. 24; 27 vs. 27; 22 vs. 18), while it was used more often 
by Inactives as a justification for giving to Inactives (4 vs. 2; 13 vs. 9; 11 vs. 6). The second 
most frequent argument was that “roles were determined by chance”, which typically served as 
a reason to allocate money to Inactives. In Treatment 1 and Treatment 3 “Egoism and
Table 3 -- Frequencies with which participants stated types of arguments 
 Treatment 1 – “Inactive divides” Treatment 2 – “Both divide” Treatment 3 – “Active divides” 
Allocating money to (...) Actives        Inactives Actives         Inactives Actives       Inactives 
was justified by (…) with an argument 
based on… Actives Inactives Actives Inactives Actives Inactives Actives Inactives Actives Inactives Actives Inactives 
amount of work / effort / time spent 24     24 2     4 27    27 9    13 22     18 6    11 
roles were determined by chance 0     0 3     5 0    0 7    11 1      1 12     5 
egoism / maximization of gains x     x 12    10 0    0 0     1 5      6 x     x 
both are needed / team of two 0     0 0     1 1    1 4     6 0      0 4     2 
having power / decision rights x     x 0     3 0    1 6     4 0      0 x     x 
solidarity / altruism 1     0 x     x 0    0 0     0 x      x 1     7 
the other gains already € 3 x     x 0     0 2    1 0     0 4      0 x     x 
other 0     0 3     3 0    1 0     1 0      1 0     0 
Sum of all arguments 25    24 20    26 30   31 26    36 32     26 23    25 
• Numbers are absolute frequencies 
• x means “not applicable” 
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maximization of personal gain” was stated as a reason for the party with absolute power to keep 
money for themselves. It was stated twice as often, however, as an argument for Inactives to 
keep money in Treatment 1 than for Actives in Treatment 3 (12 and 10 vs. 5 and 6). Several 
people emphasized that the team consisted of two people, so that the Inactive should get part of 
the allocation. “Solidarity” was stated almost exclusively by Inactives in Treatment 3 as a 
reason to give money to them. 
5 Discussion of implications 
The psychology of fairness perceptions 
Fairness judgments across all experimental treatments ranged almost exclusively between 
€ 5 and € 10 to the Active. Arguments mostly referred to “amount of work / effort / time spent”, 
and frequently to “roles determined by chance” and “both needed / team of two” . Hence, 
fairness judgments and arguments support a combination of meritocratic and egalitarian 
reasoning for participants’ fairness intuitions. There is no explicit evidence for libertarian 
reasoning to support a very low wage to the Active. Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) argue that 
whenever the context suggests asymmetric attribution of entitlement, then meritocratic 
reasoning will be applied. Our results did not confirm this claim. Rather, we observed that 
within an identical context, people who contributed actively to the generation of economic gain 
judged fairness more in accordance to meritocracy, while those who did not contribute actively 
often judged the equal split as fair (see figures 2 to 4). Messick and Sentis (1979) also found 
such role-dependent application of fairness notions in survey statements about hypothetical 
labor scenarios. In their study, people who were said to have worked more on a joint task 
generally believed that they should earn more, while those who were said to have worked less 
often stated that both parties should be paid equally. As noted in the outset, such differences are 
in line with the so-called “self-serving bias” in fairness judgments (see Babcock and 
Loewenstein, 1997).  
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The most novel aspect of our study concerns the impact of decision power on fairness 
judgments. In general, Table 2 reveals that the assignment of more power to one party lead to 
higher judgments of what is fair for that party to receive: the more power was assigned to 
Actives, the higher was what both parties judged as a fair payment to the Active. Interestingly, 
for both parties the difference in fairness judgments was statistically significant between 
absolute power and shared power, but not between shared power and no power. When Inactives 
were assigned absolute power to decide they tended to make fairness judgments that were 
significantly lower (see mean judgments in Table 2; also in Treatment 1 68% judged € 5 as fair 
vs. 37% and 30% in the other two treatments). Actives, on the other hand, tended to emphasize 
merit in a significantly more pronounced manner when they were assigned absolute power to 
decide (see mean judgments in Table 2; also in Treatment 3, 46% judged € 10 as fair vs. 24% 
and 19% in the other two treatments).  
The psychological literature provides two prominent explanations for our findings. First, 
psychologists usually think of self-serving biases in terms of cognitive dissonance reduction 
(Festinger, 1957). Here, conflicting desires to gain more money in the experiment and to adhere 
to fairness may have caused cognitive dissonance, which participants reduced by interpreting 
fairness in a way that was more in line with their monetary self-interest. One may conclude that 
it is not only self-interest but in particular the power to act in one’s self-interest which mediates 
and enhances the need to reduce dissonance. 
Secondly, even though differences between shared power and no power did not turn out 
statistically significant, the general direction of all differences may point towards a “just world 
effect” (Lerner and Miller, 1978). According to this effect, “individuals have a need to believe 
that they live in a world where people generally get what they deserve “(p.1030). In the present 
case, the powerful would deserve their power and the mere fact that they have power would 
justify an increase in what is fair for them to receive. 
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Organizational design 
 Fairness in the division of economic gain may be a desirable criterion for institutions with 
productive activity, e.g. business organizations. Decision power, on the other hand, is a design 
variable for organizational arrangements. In our three experimental treatments, decision power 
about the division of the excess gain was assigned differently, and results showed that decision 
power influenced the results in two ways. First, participants with decision power tended to 
deviate from fairness in favor of their monetary self-interest. While there were exceptions and 
many participants traded off self-interest and fairness concerns to some extent, it was still true 
that more power on average resulted in significantly higher payments to the powerful party (see 
first row in Table 2). Second, power generally shifted fairness judgments in the direction of the 
powerful party, and in particular it corrupted the judgments of parties with absolute power in 
favor of their self-interest. Consequently, when decision power was shared, discrepancies in 
fairness perceptions between the interacting parties were significantly smaller, and actual 
divisions were considerably closer to what participants judged as fair. 
For institutions which aspire fairness in division of economic gain, these results suggest 
that all parties which are involved in the creation of economic wealth should be assigned 
decision power. This is so not only because it will result in more balanced outcomes, but also 
because the fairness perceptions of the different parties will be more homogeneous. 
For instance, consider the case of executive compensation which was mentioned at the 
outset. Executives are active contributors compared to the typically inactive shareholders. Our 
results suggest that when executives have a lot of power and control in organizations, they are 
likely to take a large share of the economic gain for themselves at the cost of shareholders. 
Moreover, executives will judge it fair to do so. On the other hand, when owners of a company 
are inactive but have full power over the division of the economic gain, it can be expected that 
many pay less than a fair wage to the active contributors, namely executives and workers. 
Again, this will go along with a biased perception of fairness. One may suspect that such unfair 
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practices are a reason - or at least give additional impetus - to public demands for regulatory 
measures such as corporate governance and minimum wages or for “Fair Trade”. Our results 
can be interpreted to support a more indirect measure to enhance distributive fairness: 
participative decision structures which give active representation and power to all parties who 
are involved in the generation of economic gain. 
It is noteworthy that more equitable decision processes should also fare better with regards 
to so called “procedural fairness”. There is empirical evidence that people have a preference for 
fair procedures in addition to their preferences over allocations (see e.g., Anand, 2001, Bolton, 
Brandts, and Ockenfels, 2005). 
From a philosophical perspective, our findings relate to Rawls’ (1985) discourse on 
“justice as fairness”. Rawls recognizes that full consensus on metaphysical conceptions of 
justice is unlikely in a free society. Instead, he emphasizes the need to establish appropriate 
conditions which “situate free and equal persons fairly and must not allow some persons greater 
bargaining advantages than others (p.235)”.4 Whereas Rawls focuses primarily on the political 
realm, his analysis is initially meant to apply very generally to “a society’s main political, 
social, and economic institutions (p.225)”. Our experimental results suggest a conclusion very 
similar to his for the division of gain within economic institutions: When general consensus on 
the question of distributive justice is unlikely, the appropriate conditions, e.g., of shared power, 
may be the key to fairer and more acceptable outcomes. 
6 Conclusions 
We used an experimental laboratory setting to study divisions of economic gain from 
production, and to elicit judgments concerning what is a fair division. The experiment provided 
a simplified labour context in which only one of two participants worked actively on a task to 
generate the gain. Results showed that in their allocation decisions participants traded off 
                                                 
 
4 The well-known “veil of ignorance” is a hypothetical ideal representation of such conditions.  
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fairness and monetary self-interest, and that many divided unfairly in their self-interest, even 
according to their own subjective judgments. Fairness perceptions reflected both meritocratic 
and egalitarian considerations. In contrast, participants did not seem to intuit libertarian 
reasoning.  
The most novel aspect of this study was its focus on the impact of decision power, which 
we assigned differently across three experimental treatments. First, power shifted the divisions, 
i.e., the more decision power was assigned to the active participant the higher was his share of 
the gain. More surprisingly, power shifted the perceptions of fairness. The more decision power 
was assigned to the active participant, the higher was the share that was considered fair for him 
to receive. In particular, absolute power for one party compared to the case of shared power 
significantly biased the fairness perceptions of the powerful party in a self-serving direction. 
Consequently, while fairness judgments across all treatments were characterized by a significant 
self-serving bias, the discrepancy in fairness perceptions was significantly less pronounced 
when power was shared. 
These findings are interesting from a psychological perspective, but they may also have 
important implications for policy making. Our results suggest that participative decision 
structures in organizations can enhance fairness in the division of economic gain. Moreover, 
since fairness perceptions tend to be more homogeneous in systems of shared power, the effect 
on perceived fairness goes beyond the impact of power on actual divisions. 
We emphasize that while fairness may be desirable for many reasons, it is only one among 
different criteria for the design of corporate structures. Efficiency considerations, for example, 
have been excluded in this study by construction of the experimental design, i.e. a fixed gain for 
task completion. Also, it is important to note that our experiment does not deal with the question 
how risk associated with different inputs is fairly compensated. It may be fruitful to adapt our 
experimental benchmark setting for addressing such issues in further research. 
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Appendix - Experimental instructions 
(Differences between Treatments 1, 2 and 3 are indicated in italics.) 
 
Instructions  
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment which is part of a research project. You will have to make 
decisions. The money you can win depends on your decisions and on the decisions of the other 
participants. From now on please do not talk until the end of the experiments. Thank you very much! 
 
You have  aready gained € 2 for coming to the experiment. Now we tell you how the experiment works 
and how you can gain more money. 
 
The experiment 
 
Actors 
The experiment consists of an interaction between two actors: A1 and A2. Each of you will be randomly 
assigned a role (A1 or A2). You will be matched randomly to build pairs “A1 – A2”. You know that you 
will be assigned a counterpart of the other role, but you will never know who he/she is.  
 
Payments 
A2 has to do an exercise. If he/she completes the exercise successfully, a total gain of € 16 is generated. 
From these € 16 both are paid €3 for sure. The rest will be paid provisionally to A1. / The rest will be paid 
provisionally to A2. /  A1 and A2 have to agree how to divide the rest (€ 10) between them.  
Actions 
A2 has a maximum of 20 minutes to complete the exercise in order to generate the € 16. If A2 does not 
complete the exercise within 20 minutes the gain of € 16 will not be generated. 
 
The exercise consists in  several parts of a text. The entire exercise takes between 10 and 15 minutes if 
A2 works calmly but with full concentration. As said, A2 has a maximum of 20 minutes.  
While A2 is working A1 has nothing special to do, but waits until A2 has finished. He/she can read (we 
have today’s newspaper), relax, etc.  
When A2 has finished the exercise, A1 decides how to divide the € 10 between him/herself and A2. / ..., 
A2 decides how to divide the € 10 between him/herself and A1. / ..., both decide about the division of the 
€ 10 by making  proposals simultaneously until they agree.  
 
Important: Participation by all actors is voluntary!  
When you know your role and the rules you can decide whether you want to continue with the experiment 
(that you accept your role and the rules) or you can leave (with the € 2). 
 
We repeat the process of the experiment 
 
1) Distribution of the roles and decision whether to participate or not 
 
It will be randomly decided how is A1 and A1. The distribution of the roles will be sequential so that 
it can take a few minutes until you have your role. When you are given your role, you have to decide 
if you want to continue with the experiment or leave. The distribution is finished when everyone has 
a role.  
Remember that you have gained € 2 for sure for coming to the experiment. If you continue with the 
experiment and if A2 completes the exercise correctly then you receive at least € 3 more.  
 
2) Exercise 
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A2 counts letters of a text. The information which letter to count will appear on the computer screen. 
The exercise will take approximately 15 minutes. All A2 have to complete the task before the 
experiment proceeds.  
A1 can relax, read, etc. 
If A2 completes the exercise in 20 minutes then a total gain of € 16 is generated.  
  
3) Division 
 
A1 divides the additional gain of € 10 between him/herself and A2. / A2 divides the additional gain of 
€ 10 between him/herself and A1. / A1 and A2 divide the additional gain of € 10 between themselves.  
That means he/she / they can decide between 11 different divisions: 
 
1)   € 10 for A1   € 0 for A2  
2)   € 9 for A1   € 1 for A2  
...  ...    ... 
10)  € 1 for A1   € 9 for A2 
11)  € 0 for A1   € 10 for A2 
 
If the proposals from A1 and A2 coincide, then the division is implemented. If the proposals do not 
coincide, A1 and A2 will have to make new proposals. That process is repeated until the proposals 
coincide. You will see the proposals of the other on the screen.  
 
4) Questionnaire 
5) Payments 
 
Remember that the payments involve real money for the participants. 
No one will know your results or your decisions in the experiment.  
If you have a question please ask the experimenter at any time.  
Thank you very much for your participation!  
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